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PATIENT THREATS AGAINST THIRD PARTIES:
THE PSYCHOTHERAPIST'S DUTY OF
REASONABLE CARE
Charles B. McCarty
Violent crime in the United States has reached epidemic proportions.'
Approximately one in ten Americans will be a victim of violent crime during
their lifetime.' These frightening statistics are paralleled by the need for
mental health care in the United States. An estimated thirty-four million
Americans seek professional mental health care each year.' Out of these
thirty-four million patients, psychotherapists4 consider 900,000 potentially
dangerous.5 Amazingly, only 31,000 warnings are issued annually by psy-
1. The United States Bureau of the Census reported 199,300 murders, 597,000 forcible
rapes, 4,313,000 robberies, and 4,965,000 aggravated assaults for 1971-1980. BUREAU OF THE
CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 1981, at
173 (102d ed. 1981). Significantly, each category of violent crime showed an increase during
the reporting period. Id.
2. This figure is conservative. It is based upon the Census statistics for the 1975-1979
time period. Those statistics show that 48 people out of 1000 are annual victims of violent
crime. Id. at 176. Therefore, I in 20 Americans are victims each year.
A lifetime rate can be calculated by multiplying the annual number of victims (48) by the
average life span (73 years) (the average lifespan in this formula is being reduced by the Census
statistics which begin with victims age 12) divided by the number of victims per 1000. There-
fore, 48 x 61 + 1000 = 2.928 violent crimes per person per lifetime. Certainly, this formula
does not provide for chronic victims. However, the underlying data refers only to offenses
known to police.
Assuming that the lifetime formula is unreliable, the estimate of I in 10 victims per lifetime
is valid in that the annual rate of 1 in 20 would lead a reasonable person to conclude that a
different five percent of the population would be victimized over an average lifespan.
3. E. OGG, THE PSYCHOTHERAPIE TODAY 3 (Public Affairs Pamphlet No. 596)(lst ed.
1981).
4. Psychotherapist is defined as: "A person, usually a psychiatrist or clinical psycholo-
gist, professionally trained and engaged in psychotherapy." STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTION-
ARY 1167 (5th ed. 1982). Psychotherapy is defined as: "Psychotherapeutics; treatment of
emotional, behavioral, personality, and psychiatric disorders based primarily upon verbal or
nonverbal communication with the patient, in contrast to treatments utilizing chemicals and
physical measures. .. ." Id.
5. This figure was derived by adding the number of psychologists (44,000) and psychia-
trists (38,000) together (82,000) and multiplying by .8 (80% is the percentage of psychologists
and psychiatrists who reported treating at least 1 potentially dangerous patient a year)(82,000
x .8 = 65,600) and, thereafter, multiplying 65,600 by 13.87 (the mean number of potentially
dangerous patients seen each year by the psychiatrists and psychologists who reported treating
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chotherapists regarding these dangerous patients.6
In 1976, the California Supreme Court held that psychotherapists owe a
duty of reasonable care to third parties when a patient threatens those par-
ties.' This holding set off an avalanche of criticism within the medical' and
legal professions.9 The critics argued that confidentiality'" and the inability
to predict dangerous behavior placed an unreasonable burden on psycho-
therapists." This Note rejects both these arguments and maintains that the
at least one potentially dangerous patient per year) equals 909,872 potentially dangerous pa-
tients seen each year by psychologists and psychiatrists. The number of psychologists and
psychiatrists was obtained in telephone interviews with Dr. Russ Newman, Research Depart-
ment of the American Psychological Association (March 16, 1988) and Reed Blalock, Man-
power Research, American Psychiatric Association (March 9, 1988). The percentage and
mean number of potentially dangerous patients data is based upon statistics developed by the
California Psychiatric Association and Stanford Law Review. Note, Where the Public Peril
Begins: A Survey of Psychotherapists to Determine the Effects of Tarasoff, 31 STAN. L. REV.
165, 176 (1978)[hereinafter Note, Survey].
If the definition is expanded to include social workers with a master's degree (approximately
50,000) the number of potentially dangerous patients seen each year would increase to
1,464,672.
6. This figure was computed by adding the total number of psychologists (44,000) and
psychiatrists (38,000) together (82,000) and multiplying by .376 (the percentage of psycholo-
gists and psychiatrists who reported giving a warning within the last year)(82,000 x .376 =
30,832) to equal 30,832 dangerous patient warnings by psychotherapists each year. Note, Sur-
vey, supra note 5, at 179 n.75.
If the definition of psychotherapist were to be expanded to include social workers with
master's degrees (approximately 50,000) the number of warnings would increase to 49,632.
7. Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California, 17 Cal. 3d 425, 442, 551 P.2d 334,
348, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14, 27 (1976).
8. See, e.g., Stone, The Tarasoff Decisions: Suing Psychotherapists to Safeguard Society,
90 HARV. L. REV. 358 (1976) [hereinafter Stone]; Roth & Meisel, Dangerousness, Confidenti-
ality and the Duty to Warn, 134 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 508 (1977); Gurevitz, Tarasoff: Protective
Privilege Versus Public Peril, 134 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 289 (1977); Karasu, The Ethics of Psy-
chotherapy, 137 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1502 (1980); Steadman & Cocozza, Stimulus/Response:
We Can't Predict Who is Dangerous, PSYCHOLOGY TODAY, Jan. 1975, at 32.
9. See, e.g., Slovenko, Psychotherapy and Confidentiality, 24 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 375
(1975) [hereinafter Slovenko]; Wexler, Patients, Therapists and Third Parties: The Victimologi-
cal Virtues ofTarasoff, 2 INT'L J. L. & PSYCHIATRY 1 (1979); Saltzburg, Privileges and Profes-
sionals: Lawyers and Psychiatrists, 66 VA. L. REV. 597 (1980); George, Korin, Quattrone &
Mandel, The Therapists' Duty to Protect Third Parties: A Guide for the Perplexed, 14 RUTGERS
L.J. 637 (1983); Comment, Tarasoff and the Psychotherapist's Duty to Warn, 12 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 932 (1975); Note, Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California: The Psychotherapist's
Peril, 37 U. PIrr. L. REV. 155 (1975); Note, The Dangerous Patient Exception and the Duty to
Warn: Creation of a Dangerous Precedent? 9 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 549 (1976); Note, Imposing
a Duty to Warn on Psychiatrists: A Judicial Threat to the Psychiatric Profession, 48 U. COLO.
L. REV. 283 (1977); Note, The Application of the Tarasoff Duty to Forensic Psychiatry, 66 VA.
L. REV. 715 (1980).
10. For purposes of this Note, confidentiality refers io the psychotherapist's professional
obligation to keep his patient's disclosures private.
11. See supra notes 8 & 9.
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majority of psychotherapists do not believe in or practice strict confidential-
ity12 and that predicting dangerousness is something psychotherapists do
quite often. 13 Moreover, a utilitarian 14 approach would require that psycho-
therapists protect third parties.' 5
It is asserted that requiring such a duty would provide a greater benefit to
society than not imposing such a duty. The benefits would flow to the pa-
tient in that he would receive proper treatment 16 and rehabilitation. This
12. A survey of 1,272 Californian psychotherapists in 1978, conducted by the Stanford
Law Review and the California Psychiatric Association, found that 69.7% of the psychothera-
pists thought a breach of confidentiality could be justified and 49.7% had warned a third party
prior to Tarasoff. Note, Survey, supra note 5, at 176 n.65 & 183 n.97. The Survey results
compare favorably with two more recent studies. Shuman & Weiner, The Privilege Study: An
Empirical Examination of the Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege, 60 N.C.L. REV. 893, 934-38
(1982) [hereinafter Shuman & Weiner] (51% of the 79 therapists had warned a third party and
88% said confidentiality was not absolute); Beck, When the Patient Threatens Violence: An
Empirical Study of Clinical Practice after Tarasoff, 10 AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. No. 3
(1978) [hereinafter Beck] (16 psychiatrists out of 38 had given warnings and 36 of 38 said they
accepted the Tarasoff duty).
In addition, Dr. Alfred Freedman, Past President of The American Psychiatric Association,
agrees that a breach of confidentiality is appropriate in a Tarasoff situation. See N.Y. Times,
Dec. 25, 1974, at 15, col. 2 quoted in Slovenko, supra note 9, at 393. Freud published case
histories asserting he had a duty to science, the profession, and society regarding the study and
cure of personality disorders. See S. FREUD, NOTES UPON A CASE OF OBSESSIONAL NEURO-
SIS cited in 7 J. STRACHEY, STANDARD EDITION OF THE COMPLETE PSYCHOLOGICAL WORKS
OF SIGMUND FREUD 7-9 (1964). See also Slovenko, supra note 9, at 382 n.24.
13. The Stanford Survey found that a significant number of psychotherapists had pre-
dicted dangerous behavior by a patient prior to Tarasoff and in the one year subsequent to
Tarasoff. (573 psychotherapists had warned either the police or a third party prior to Tarasoff
and 426 psychotherapists had warned the police or a third party subsequent to Tarasoff).
Note, Survey, supra note 5, at 179 n.76.
Most states require a showing of dangerousness, either to oneself or others, before commit-
ment will be judicially approved. Comment, Bitter Freedom: Deinstitutionalization and the
Homeless, 3 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 205, 210-21 (1987). See generally Miller &
Fiddleman, Involuntary Civil Commitment in North Carolina: The Result of the 1979 Statutory
Changes, 60 N.C.L. REV. 985 (1982); Ennis & Litwack, Psychiatry and the Presumption of
Expertise: Flipping Coins in the Courtroom, 62 CALIF. L. REV. 693 (1974) [hereinafter Ennis &
Litwack].
14. Utilitarianism is "a doctrine that the useful is the good and that the determining con-
sideration of right conduct should be the usefulness of its consequences . WEBSTER'S
THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2525 (1981).
15. Currie v. United States, 644 F. Supp. 1074, 1079-84 (M.D. N.C. 1986). But see,
Thompson v. County of Alameda, 27 Cal. 3d 741, 614 P.2d 728, 167 Cal. Rptr. 70 (1980);
Note, Professional Obligation and the Duty to Rescue: When Must a Psychiatrist Protect His
Patient's Intended Victim? 91 YALE L.J. 1430, 1433-34 n.20 (1982); Stone, supra note 8, at 359
(1979).
16. "North Carolina courts have stated that "[i]n a real sense the [involuntary commit-
ment] proceeding is an important step in [a patient's] medical and psychiatric treatment."
Currie v. United States, 644 F. Supp. 1074, 1081 (M.D.N.C. 1986) (quoting In re Farrow, 255
S.E.2d at 777, 780 (N.C. Ct. App. 1979)).
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would in turn prevent criminal and civil proceedings resulting from the frui-
tion of the threatened activity. The psychotherapist will benefit his patient
by getting him the necessary treatment and saving the patient from civil and
criminal proceedings. 7 In addition, the psychotherapist's conscience and
professional responsibility' 8 will be satisfied. Moreover, the psychothera-
pist's duty to society, safeguarding the public from dangerous patients, is
covered.19 The innocent third party will benefit in that they will not suffer a
threatened attack. Society regains trust in the psychotherapist in that dan-
gerous patients are not endangering third parties.2 ° Further, the human re-
sources, the patient and the third party, are safeguarded for productive
enterprises. The justice system, both civil and criminal, is spared the time
and expense of proceedings resulting from the threatened altercations. The
negatives, or costs, arising from the Tarasoff duty are the lost liberty of the
patient and the psychotherapist's possible loss of the patient. However, the
17. See, e.g., Currie v. United States, 644 F. Supp. at 1077. ("A North Carolina Court of
Appeals opinion, In re Farrow, 41 N.C. App. 680, 255 S.E.2d 777 (1979), has cited Tarasoff
with seeming approval when discussing a psychotherapist's duty to disclose when necessary to
protect his patient .... ); See also McIntosh v. Milano, 168 N.J. Super. 466, 491-93, 403 A.2d
500, 512-13 (1979).
18. "[The principle of professional obligation] would require a person who enters an occu-
pation in which he reasonably can expect to have an increased chance of finding a helpless or
endangered person to take affirmative steps to protect such a person." Note, Professional Obli-
gation and the Duty to Rescue: When Must a Psychiatrist Protect His Patient's Intended Vic-
tim? 91 YALE L.J. 1430, 1431 (1982).
19. The doctor's duty to protect society from patients with contagious diseases is recog-
nized by common law and statute. E.g., Simonsen v. Swenson, 104 Neb. 224, 227, 177 N.W.
831, 832 (1920); In re Farrow, 41 N.C. App. 680, 255 S.E.2d 777 (1979); Bradley Center, Inc.
v. Wessner, 250 Ga. 199, 201, 296 S.E.2d 693, 695-96 (1982). The courts have transferred this
duty to the psychotherapist. Currie v. United States, 644 F. Supp. 1074, 1077-78 (M.D.N.C.
1986); Lipari v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 497 F. Supp. 185, 191 (D. Neb. 1980); McIntosh v.
Milano, 168 N.J. Super. 466, 484-90, 403 A.2d 500, 509-12 (1979); Peck v. Counseling Service
of Addison Co., 146 Vt. 61, 63, 499 A.2d 422, 425 (1985).
20. In this risk-infested society we can hardly tolerate the further exposure to dan-
ger that would result from a concealed knowledge of the therapist that his patient
was lethal .... [W]e see no sufficient societal interest that would protect and justify
concealment. The containment of such risks lies in the public interest.
Tarasoff, 17 Cal. 3d at 442, 551 P.2d at 347-48, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 27-28.
The power and status that psychotherapists enjoy in our society is most evident in their
commitment powers. Ennis & Litwack have noted this unique power:
In many states persons who are not considered physically dangerous to themselves or
to others can be hospitalized involuntarily even without judicial proceedings, if two
psychiatrists certify that the prospective patient is "mentally ill" and in need of treat-
ment. No state authorizes two laymen-a grocer and a clerk for example-to hospi-
talize a neighbor simply because the laymen believe he or she is mentally ill and in
need of treatment. This extraordinary power is given to psychiatrists but not to lay-
men because legislators and judges assume that psychiatrists are uniquely qualified to
determine when an individual requires hospitalization.
Ennis & Litwack, supra note 13, at 695.
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benefits outweigh the costs.2 1
Part I of this Note will review Tarasoff v. Regents of University of Califor-
nia,2 2 the 1976 California Supreme Court decision which established the
psychotherapists' duty of reasonable care to third parties. Special attention
will be given to the confidentiality and prediction of dangerousness argu-
ments. This Note will also address subsequent case law and legislative ac-
tion. In conclusion, this Note will argue that such a duty is correct based
upon current practice and utilitarian theory.
I. Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California: THE DUTY OF
REASONABLE CARE
On October 27, 1969, Prosenjit Poddar stabbed Tatiana Tarasoff to
death.2 3 The murderer's motivation was unrequited love.24 Prior to the
murder, Poddar had been in therapy at the University of California's Cowell
Memorial Hospital.25 During therapy Poddar disclosed that he wanted to
kill Tarasoff.2 6 The psychologist, Dr. Lawrence Moore, consulted with two
psychiatrists, Doctors Gold and Yandell, and jointly agreed that emergency,
involuntary commitment was necessary.27 The campus police were alerted
and instructed to detain Poddar. The police detained Poddar, but subse-
quently released him based upon their independent evaluation.28 The Direc-
tor of Cowell Memorial Hospital's Psychiatry Department, Dr. Powelson,
reviewed and reversed the decision to seek emergency, involuntary commit-
21. The Tarasoff decision is based upon the balancing of the competing interests. Key in
the court's mind was the CAL. EvID. CODE § 1024 (West 1965), which provided for disclo-
sure. This legislative proclamation was deemed a cost-benefit analysis. Tarasoff, 17 Cal. 3d at
440-41, 551 P.2d at 346-47, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 26-27.
Obviously, courts who follow Tarasoffare accepting this cost-benefit analysis. See McIntosh
v. Milano, 168 N.J. Super. 466, 403 A.2d 500 (1979); Lipari v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 497 F.
Supp. 185 (D. Neb. 1980); Leedy v. Hartnett, 510 F. Supp. 1125 (M.D. Pa. 1981); Jablonski v.
United States, 712 F.2d 391 (9th Cir. 1983); Davis v. Lhim, 124 Mich. App. 291, 335 N.W.2d
481 (1983); Peck v. Counseling Service of Addison County, 146 Vt. 61, 499 A.2d 422 (1985);
Currie v. United States, 644 F. Supp. 1074 (M.D. N.C. 1986). Various commentators have
reached the same conclusion. Eg., Fleming & Maximov, The Patient or His Victim: The
Therapist's Dilemma, 62 CALIF. L. REV. 1025 (1974) [hereinafter Fleming & Maximov];
Note, Psychiatrist-Patient Privilege-A Need for the Retention of the Future Crime Exception,
52 IOWA L. REV. 1170 (1967).
22. 17 Cal. 3d 425, 551 P.2d 334, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1976).
23. People v. Poddar, 10 Cal. 3d 750, 754, 518 P.2d 342, 345, 111 Cal. Rptr. 910, 913
(1974).
24. Id. at 753-54, 518 P.2d at 344-45, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 912-13.
25. Tarasoff, 17 Cal. 3d at 430-32, 551 P.2d at 339-41, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 19-21.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 432, 551 P.2d at 341, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 21.
28. Id.
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ment proceedings against Poddar.29 No effort was made to warn Tatiana
Tarasoff.
Tarasoff's parents brought suit against the University, the doctors, and
the campus police.3° The trial court granted defendants' demurrer to plain-
tiffs' complaints without leave to amend."a The California Supreme Court
reversed.32
Judge Tobriner, writing for the court, held that: "When a therapist deter-
mines, or pursuant to the standards of his profession should determine that
his patient presents a serious danger of violence to another, he incurs an
obligation to use reasonable care to protect the intended victim against dan-
ger.''33 This duty of reasonable care was predicated on the foreseeability of
Poddar killing Tarasoff and the special relationship between the doctors and
Poddar.34
The court recognized that the common law does not impose a duty on an
individual to protect third parties from the actions of another, 35 the reason
being nonfeasance by the individual. Morally, this position has been at-
tacked.36 The exception to the nonfeasance rule is based upon the existence
of a special relationship. 37 The court declared that the therapist-patient rela-
tionship fell within the exception.3 This finding of a special relationship is
consistent with the psychotherapist-patient evidentiary privilege recognized
by California and twelve other states.39 But for this special relationship,
29. Id.
30. 33 Cal. App. 3d 275, 108 Cal. Rptr. 878 (1973) (Superior Court of Alameda County,
No. 405694, Robert L. Bostick, Judge).
31. Tarasoff, 17 Cal. 3d 425, 430.
32. Id., 17 Cal. 3d 425, 551 P.2d 334, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1976), vacating, 13 Cal. 3d 177,
529 P.2d 553, 118 Cal. Rptr. 129 (1974).
33. Id, 17 Cal. 3d at 431, 551 P.2d at 340, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 20 (J. Wright, Sullivan &
Richardson J.J. joined the opinion).
34. Id. at 434-35, 551 P.2d at 342-43, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 22-23.
35. Id. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314 (1974). The courts have
recognized the following relationships that fall within the exception: carrier-passenger; inn-
keeper-guest; ship-seaman; employer-employee; shopkeeper-business visitor; jailer-prisoner;
school-pupil; husband-wife; parent-child; landlord-tenant; tavern keeper-intoxicated patron.
W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS § 56 at 383-85 (1984); Harper & Kime, The
Duty to Control the Conduct of Another, 43 YALE L.J. 886, 886-87 (1934).
36. Bohlen, The Moral Duty to Aid Others as a Basis of Tort Liability, 56 U. PA. L. REV.
217 (1908). But see I. KANT, THE METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE (J. Ladd, trans.
1965) (Kant argues that it would be unjust to require a rescue because an individual's freedom
would be curtailed by this duty).
37. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314(A), at 315-20 (1974); W. PROSSER & W.
KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS § 56 at 374-77 (1984).
38. Tarasoff, 17 Cal. 3d at 436, 551 P.2d at 343, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 23.
39. ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 28-1001, UNIF. R. EvID. 503 (1989); CAL. EVID. CODE
§§ 1010- 1026 (West Supp. 1981); DEL. UNIF. R. EvID. 503 (1981); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.503
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there would not be an evidentiary privilege.
Once the special relationship was found, Judge Tobriner suggested that
affirmative duties flow to third parties.4' His examples included the negli-
gent release of dangerous mental patients, the failure to diagnose contagious
diseases, the failure to warn third parties of a contagious disease, and the
duty to warn patients of the danger to themselves or others.4 1 This exten-
sion of duty is logical in that "[c]onventional psychotherapy encourages pa-
tients to vent previously restrained hostility; many patients will confide a
desire to kill. . 42
Moreover,
[A therapist's] participation is at times neither neutral nor inno-
cent. Since a frequent goal of treatment is to encourage the patient
to discharge suppressed feelings, including aggression and even an-
ger, therapy often involves a period of increased instability imme-
diately preceding a breakthrough ... The result in some instances
is injury, even death, where no such tragedy might have occurred
but for the therapy.4"
This course of prodding emotional instability leads to a duty to protect the
patient from himself and the third party. In addition, the therapist creates a
duty to protect the third party from the patient because the therapist pro-
voked the instability. Analogies to dangerous instrumentalities and parent-
child (patient's mental state equated to child) situations are quite accurate.
Therefore, the psychotherapist, as a provocateur, should have an affirmative
duty to third parties.
(West 1979); ME. R. Evid. 503 (Supp. 1981); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 233, § 20B (West
1974); N.M.R. EvID. 504 (1978); N.D.R. EvID. 503 (Supp. 1981); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12
§ 2503 (West 1987); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 19-13-6 to -11 (1987); TEX. REV. CIV.
STAT. ANN. art. 5561h (Vernon Supp. 1982). See generally Shuman & Weiner, supra note 12.
The research indicates that 40 states and the District of Columbia recognize a psychologist-
patient privilege; 9 states recognize a psychiatrist-patient privilege; and 36 states and the Dis-
trict of Columbia recognize a physician-patient privilege. See Shuman & Weiner, supra note
12, at 907-11 n.100 for state code citations.
Further support for the assertion that the psychotherapist-patient relationship is special is
drawn from Proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 504, Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege. That
rule rejected a general doctor-patient privilege, yet advocated a psychotherapist-patient privi-
lege. The proposed rule was defeated due to the view that the general doctor-patient privilege
was very important and that the psychotherapist-patient privilege was part of that general
privilege. 56 F.R.D. 183, 240-44 (1972). See Saltzburg, Privileges and Professionals: Lawyers
and Psychiatrists, 66 VA. L. REV. 597, 620 (1980).
40. 17 Cal. 3d at 435-36, 551 P.2d at 343-44, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 23.
41. Id. at 436-37, 551 P.2d at 343-44, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 23-24.
42. Note, Survey, supra note 5, at 186 n.l1l.
43. Fleming & Maximov, supra note 21, at 1034. (footnotes omitted). Accord Stone, supra
note 8, at 369; J. LION, EVALUATION AND MANAGEMENT OF THE VIOLENT PATIENT (1972);
Note, supra note 21, at 1182-83.
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A. Predicting Dangerousness
First, the court considered the argument that therapists do not have the
ability to predict dangerousness." Judge Tobriner analogized psychothera-
pists to physicians and held: "Th[e] judgment of the therapist in diagnosing
emotional disorders and in predicting whether a patient presents a serious
danger of violence is comparable to the judgment which doctors and profes-
sionals must regularly render under accepted rules of responsibility."4 The
court clarified the standard by stating: "Obviously we do not require that
the therapist, in making that determination render a perfect performance;
the therapist need only exercise 'that reasonable degree of skill, knowledge,
and care ordinarily possessed and exercised by members of [that professional
specialty] under similar circumstances.' ,46 Because Dr. Moore had pre-
dicted that Poddar would kill Tarasoff, the inability to adequately predict
dangerousness argument was dismissed as irrelevant.47
The analogy between physicians and psychotherapists is appropriate in
that diagnosis and predictions of dangerousness are part of their medical
training and professional work.4" Each state provides for emergency com-
mitment based largely on the testimony of a psychotherapist.49 If the states
did not have the confidence in the ability of the psychotherapist to accu-
rately predict dangerousness, states would not allow psychotherapist testi-
mony to commit people.5 ° How can society trust psychotherapists to
evaluate and treat mental disorders? The profession denies responsibility for
dangerousness predictions while assuming the power to commit individuals.
Certainly, the therapists' place as an expert testifying in commitment pro-
44. Tarasoff, 17 Cal. 3d at 437-40, 551 P.2d at 344-46, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 24-26.
45. Id. at 438, 551 P.2d at 345, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 25.
46. Id.
47. Tarasoff, 17 Cal. 3d at 438-39, 551 P.2d at 345, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 25.
48. See supra notes 12 & 13. However, Bruce Ennis, a New York Civil Liberties Union
staff attorney on the Mental Health Law Project, and Thomas Litwack, an attorney and Assis-
tant Professor of Psychology at the City University of New York, John Jay College of Crimi-
nal Justice, have attacked the psychotherapy profession for its claimed "expertise" in
diagnosing and predicting dangerousness. The data indicates a high degree of unreliability.
Therefore, the psychotherapist's expert testimony regarding dangerousness should not be ac-
corded deference by judges, juries, and lawyers. Ennis & Litwack, supra note 13, at 694-95.
49. See Miller & Fiddleman, Involuntary Civil Commitment in North Carolina: The Re-
suits of the 1979 Statutory Changes, 60 N.C.L. REV. 985, 986-93 (1982); Fleming & Maximov,
supra note 21, at 1036-37.
50. Judge Petrella asked the same question in McIntosh v. Milano, 168 N.J. Super. 466,
493-95, 403 A.2d 500, 514 (1979): "If psychiatrists now say, as is argued in the brief of defend-
ant and the articles submitted in support thereof, that therapists are no more accurate than the
average layman [in predicting dangerousness], serious questions would arise as to the entire
present basis for commitment procedures."
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ceedings is entrenched, therefore the ability to predict dangerousness is a
complimentary burden.
B. Confidentiality
The court also considered, and rejected, the defendant's strict confidential-
ity argument. 51 The key, in the majority's view, was California Evidence
Code section 1024: "There is no privilege ... if the psychotherapist has
reasonable cause to believe that the patient is in such mental or emotional
condition as to be dangerous to himself or to the person or property of an-
other and that disclosure of the communication is necessary to prevent the
threatened danger."52
This balancing by the legislature was deemed determinative of the com-
peting confidentiality and public interest in safety issues.53 Additionally, the
majority pointed to the American Medical Association's Principles of Medi-
cal Ethics as allowing the disclosure of confidences.54
The rejection of the strict confidentiality argument coincides with the ma-
jority of psychotherapists who do not believe in or practice strict confidenti-
ality.55 In 1978, the Stanford Law Review, in cooperation with the
California Psychiatric Association, conducted a survey of Californian psy-
chotherapists.56 A total of 3,685 questionnaires were sent to psychologists
and psychiatrists.57 1,272 or thirty-five percent (35%) responded. Nearly
seventy percent (70%) of the respondents felt that confidentiality could be
breached,5" and fifty percent (50%) of the respondents had warned a third
party prior to Tarasoff.59 This finding is in accord with other sources.'
Furthermore, the rejection of strict confidentiality is beneficial to all par-
51. Tarasoff, 17 Cal. 3d at 440-42, 551 P.2d at 346-48, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 26-27.
52. CAL. EvID. CODE § 1024 (West 1987).
53. Tarasoff, 17 Cal. 3d at 440-41, 551 P.2d at 346-48, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 26-27.
54. A physician may not reveal the confidence entrusted to him in the course of
medical attendance . . . unless he is required to do so by law or unless it becomes
necessary in order to protect the welfare of the individual or of the community.
PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL ETHICS, § 9, AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION (1957), quoted in
17 Cal. 3d at 441-42, 551 P.2d at 347, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 27. (emphasis by court) (footnote
omitted). See also supra note 5 for additional supporting sources.
55. See supra note 5.
56. Note, Survey, supra note 5.
57. Id. at 173-74.
58. Id. at 176 n.65.
59. Id. at 178-79 nn.74 & 75.
60. See supra note 5 and Slovenko, supra note 9, at 393 (Dr. Alfred Freedman and Dr.
Emanuel Tanay quoted in support); Stone, supra note 8, at 375:
If, however, the therapist believes that he has overcome the problem of prediction and
decided that his patient is dangerous and that the public and patient need protection,
he does have a clear moral duty which allows a legal duty to be imposed.
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ties: patient, psychotherapist, third party, and society. 61 From the patient's
point of view he is benefitted by receiving the treatment he needs without the
trauma of following through on his threat.62 Certainly, the patient's invol-
untary detention or betrayed confidence is less important than committing
the murder, and suffering the criminal and civil proceedings, together with
the lifelong shame of committing murder. Secondly, the psychotherapist
will benefit by protecting his patient, third parties, society, and profession
from the murder.6 3 This multifaceted affair would scar his patient for life;
generate a negative image in society of the profession and patients in general;
burden the justice system with criminal and civil proceedings; and unneces-
sarily sacrifice an innocent party's life. Obviously, the third party would
benefit by staying uninjured. Finally, society would benefit from a safer en-
vironment.64 Dangerous patients might be rendered harmless and rehabili-
tated to contribute to society. Psychotherapists would enjoy a better
reputation by fulfilling their obligation to maintain a safe society. Third par-
ties would enjoy a safe environment, prosper and thereby enhance society.
C. Other Opinions
Judge Mosk concurred and dissented. 65 He agreed with the result based
upon the fact that the therapist had actually predicted the murder of Tatiana
Tarasoff but he dissented from a rule holding therapists negligent for failing
to predict violence based upon community standards.66
Sadoff, Changing Laws and Ethics in Psychiatry, 5 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCH. & L. 34, 37
(1977).
61. Other exceptions to the Doctor-Patient privilege include: communicable diseases (tu-
berculosis, venereal disease, and various other conditions) N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26: 4-15 (West
1987); child abuse 33 VT. STAT. ANN. § 683-84 (Supp. 1984); gunshot wounds N.J. STAT.
REV. § 2A: 170-25.7 (West 1985) and 13 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13 § 4012 (1974); abuse of the
elderly 18 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18 §§ 1152-53 (Supp. 1988); epilepsy (report to DMV) N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 39:3 - 10.4 (West 1973). See Peck v. Counseling Service of Addison County,
146 Vt. 61, 61-62, 65-68, 499 A.2d 422, 426 (1985); McIntosh v. Milano, 168 N.J. Super. 466,
484-85, 403 A.2d 500, 509 (1979).
62. -Many authorities assert that patient threats are cries for help to the therapist asking
for control from the violent urges. J. LION, EVALUATION AND MANAGEMENT OF THE VIO-
LENT PATIENT (1972); Slovenko, supra note 9, at 393 (1975); Solzman, Truth, Honesty, and
the Therapeutic Process, 130 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1280 (1973).
63. A patient in treatment has the right to expect from his therapist a rescue inter-
vention in the face of realistic danger. To be the perpetrator of a homicide is one of
the most self destructive actions one can take. The therapist as a human being also
has an obligation to an innocent victim and, last but not least, he has a duty to his
own human dignity....
Dr. Tanay, PSYCHIAT. NEWS, Apr. 16, 1975, at 2.
64. Tarasoff, 17 Cal. 3d at 442, 551 P.2d at 347-48, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 27-28.
65. Id. at 451, 551 P.2d at 353, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 33.
66. Id. at 451-52, 551 P.2d at 353-54, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 33-34.
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The Judge accepted the argument that psychotherapists are unable, to any
reliable degree, to predict dangerousness. Implicitly, he would strip psycho-
therapists of their power regarding emergency involuntary commitment and
expert witness status in judicial proceedings. This idea has been endorsed by
several commentators.6 7
In dissent, Judge Clark argued that the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act68
bars disclosure by the psychotherapists. Alternatively, Judge Clark argued
that the common law and public policy favor nondisclosure. 69 He suggested
that warnings would increase violence while diminishing or even negating
therapeutic treatments. This result would unjustly impinge on patient rights
while taxing society.7°
Judge Clark's theory assumes too much. First, the patient and psycho-
therapist are given credit for the prevention of dangerousness. No statistics
are given regarding the deterrent effect disclosure has on patients seeking
treatment, successful treatment, violence, or civil commitment.7 1 Three sub-
sequent empirical studies indicate Judge Clark is incorrect.7 2 One commen-
tator summed up the research as:
[C]ontrary to the fears of [Tarasoff psychotherapist] amici and
others, the warnings given seldom had an adverse effect on the
therapeutic relationship. Only warnings that were not discussed
with the patient or one which was given without good reason were
judged to be harmful to the therapeutic relationship....
A warning that is discussed strengthens an alliance because the
therapist demonstrates to the patient the ability to retain his thera-
peutic concern even in the face of imminent danger.
67. See, e.g., Ennis & Litwack, supra note 13, at 735-43. See also supra note 42.
68. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5000, (West 1987).
69. Tarasoff, 17 Cal. 3d at 457-64, 551 P.2d at 358-62, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 38-40.
70. Id. at 460-62, 551 P.2d at 360-61, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 40-41.
71. Id. at 458-73, 551 P.2d at 358-62, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 38-42.
72. Id. See Survey, supra note 5, at 182 n.90 (data indicates little if no decline in the
number of patients seeking treatment after Tarasofi). "There has been no credible evidence
either that the practice of psychotherapy has suffered or the violence within our society has
increased because of the imposition of such a duty." See also Goodman, 3 BEHAV. Sci. & L.
195, 219 (1985) (quoted in Currie v. United States, 644 F. Supp. 1074, 1082 (M.D.N.C. 1986)).
Shuman & Weiner, supra note 12, at 918-19 (data indicated that patients were not deterred
from seeking psychiatric help prior to the evidentiary privilege); Id. at 926-27 (data also indi-
cated no psychological harm upon disclosure); Beck, supra note 12, at 193-94 (in 14 cases
when the warning was discussed with the patient prior to informing the third party no adverse
effect was seen, whereas four cases of no prior discussion rated a 75% negative effect on ther-
apy); Id. at 193 (in 26 cases warnings of violence occurred three times); Shuman & Weiner,
supra note 12, at 936 (only I case of violence was reported); Regarding civil commitment, the
studies were vague on this point reporting between three and four hospitalizations. Shuman &
Weiner, supra note 12, at 936; Beck, supra note 12, at 193.
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Finally, this study provides a basis on which to conclude the
Tarasoff decision is not inimical to good clinical practice and may
actually be beneficial to it."
Moreover, too little credit and concern is given to the third party and
society. It may be asserted that if the shoe was on the other foot, i.e., Judge
Clark was substituted for Ms. Tarasoff, the Judge would favor disclosure.
Third parties and society deserve the benefit of the doubt when an unstable
person admits to plotting a violent act. Therefore, Justice Clark's dissent is
skewed against the greater good of society.
II. POST TARASOFF DEVELOPMENTS
A. Case Law Developments
In the eleven years since Tarasoff, nine cases and several legislative pro-
posals have considered the issue.7" The cases have followed a three-pronged
analysis: 1) whether a special relationship existed; 2) whether specific
threats were made; and 3) whether the victim was readily identifiable.75 If
such conditions exist, the therapist owes the Tarasoff duty.
As to the first prong, whether a special relationship exists, the majority of
courts have accepted a psychotherapist-patient relationship as a special rela-
tionship.76 This is logical in that most states recognize the doctor-patient
73. Beck supra note 12, at 199-201.
74. For cases considering the issue, see: Brady v. Hopper, 751 F.2d 329 (10th Cir. 1984)
(President Reagan's press secretary, James Brady, sued a psychiatrist for injuries resulting
from John Hinckley's assassination attempt on the president); Jablonski v. United States, 712
F.2d 391 (9th Cir. 1983) (Federal Tort Claims Act suit for damages due to auto accident with
army veteran: no negligence was found); Currie v. United States, 644 F. Supp. 1074
(M.D.N.C. 1986) (wrongful death action against the Veterans' Administration for the negli-
gent release of a psychiatric out patient who subsequently killed a fellow IBM employee);
Hasenei v. United States, 541 F. Supp. 999 (D. Md. 1982) (Federal Tort Claim Act suit for
damages due to auto accident with army veteran); Doyle v. United States, 530 F. Supp. 1278
(C.D. Cal. 1982) (wrongful death action by the estate of a security guard against the Army for
negligently discharging an unstable serviceman who had been under psychiatric care); Lipari
v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 497 F. Supp. 185 (D. Neb. 1980) (wrongful death action against
Sears for selling a shotgun to out patient of Veterans' Administration psychiatric ward); Davis
v. Lhim, 124 Mich. App. 291, 335 N.W.2d 481 (1983) (jury award upheld in wrongful death
action against state hospital because staff psychiatrist negligently released patient who killed
his mother); McIntosh v. Milano, 168 N.J. Super. 466, 403 A.2d 500 (1979) (wrongful death
action against psychiatrist because teenage patient killed his girlfriend); Peck v. Counseling
Service of Addison County, Inc., 146 Vt. 61, 499 A.2d 422 (1985) (parents of mental outpa-
tient sued health agency for loss of barn, burned down by patient) [hereinafter cases]. See
infra, notes 93-110 and accompanying text regarding legislative proposals.
75. See cases supra note 74.
76. Id. But see Hasenei v. United States, 541 F. Supp. 999 (D. Md. 1982); Doyle v. United
States, 530 F. Supp. 1278 (C.D. Cal. 1982).
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evidentiary privilege." The psychotherapist-patient evidentiary privilege is
either an implicit subset of the doctor-patient privilege or explicitly deline-
ated by statute.78 All evidentiary privileges are based upon special
relationships.
However, one court maintained that an outpatient-psychotherapist situa-
tion did not satisfy the special relationship standard. 79 This holding was
based upon the lack of control or authority by the psychotherapist. This
position has been explicitly rejected by two other courts.80 In addition, sev-
eral commentators have rejected the outpatient distinction.8" Moreover, the
psychotherapist-patient evidentiary privilege does not make a distinction be-
tween inpatients and outpatients. Appreciating the fact that Tarasoff in-
volved an outpatient, the outpatient distinction is unwise in that the duty is
owed to a third party to whom the distinction is meaningless.
The second prong, whether specific threats were made, has created a split
in the courts. Some courts follow a narrow construction, while others ad-
here to an expansive construction. 2 The majority of courts have adopted
the strict construction of specific threats in an effort to limit the scope of the
psychotherapist's duty.8 3 The narrowing of this prong is appealing in that
specificity lends credibility to the patients' intentions. Moreover, the speci-
77. 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2380 (1987 Supp.); Saltzburg, Privileges and Profession-
als: Lawyers and Psychiatrists, 66 VA. L. REV. 597, 616-25 (1980); Fisher, The Psychotherapeu-
tic Professions and the Law of Privileged Communications, 10 WAYNE L. REV. 609 (1964).
78. The Federal Rules of Evidence include psychotherapists within their definition of phy-
sician for purposes of the physician-patient privilege. FED. R. EVID. 503. See generally Mc-
CORMICK ON EVIDENCE 243-46 (E. Cleary 3d ed. 1984).
79. Hasenei, 541 F. Supp. at 1009-12.
80. Jablonski v. United States, 712 F.2d 391, 396-97 (9th Cir. 1983); Peck v. Counseling
Service of Addison County, 146 Vt. 61, 65, 499 A.2d 422, 425 (1985).
81. See, e.g., Slovenko, supra note 9, at 395 ("In principle, there is no rationale in law for
making a distinction between outpatients and inpatients, though in the latter case there is a
degree of physical control."); Fleming & Maximov state:
The rationale behind these [custodial control] cases, however, does not support a
distinction between inpatients and outpatients. Admittedly, the degree of control
over the latter may well be much less than over the former, and this would certainly
be relevant in determining what protective measures could reasonably be expected,
but it would not justify a complete negation of duty.
Fleming & Maximov, supra note 21, at 1029.
82. Compare Thompson v. County of Alameda, 27 Cal. 3d 741, 754, 614 P.2d 728, 735,
167 Cal. Rptr. 70, 77 (1980) (narrow construction) with Jablonski v. United States, 712 F.2d
391, 398 (9th Cir. 1983); Lipari v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 497 F. Supp. 185, 193-95 (D.Neb.
1980); Davis v. Lhim, 124 Mich. App. 291, 305-07, 335 N.W.2d 481, 489-90 (1983) (expansive
construction).
83. See Thompson v. County of Alameda, 27 Cal. 3d at 753-55, 614 P.2d at 735-36, 167
Cal. Rptr. at 76-78; Leedy v. Hartnett, 570 F. Supp. 1333, 1339 (D. Colo. 1983), aff'd, 751
F.2d 329 (10th Cir. 1984); McIntosh v. Milano, 168 N.J. Super. 466, 487-89, 403 A.2d 500,
510-11 (1979).
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ficity of the threat allows the therapist to evaluate whether the patient would
carry it out.8
4
The final prong, a readily identifiable victim, has attracted a distinct ma-
jority in favor of narrow construction."5 The majority argues that unless the
victim is readily identifiable, general public warnings would be necessary.
These warnings would not be beneficial in that the public would not take
defensive measures, the warnings would reduce limited government re-
sources, and patients would be stigmatized and their rehabilitation ham-
pered. 86  The limiting of a readily identifiable victim is logical because
thousands of paroled criminals and mental patients are released into the gen-
eral population each year. The cost, both financial and psychological, to the
public and patients for such a warning system would be unacceptable.
Regarding the subject of strict confidentiality, the courts that have consid-
ered the question were unanimous in their rejection of the argument.87 This
84. Foresecability is the linchpin in the duty formula. In Tarasoff, Judge Tobriner identi-
fied foreseeability as the key element, together with a special relationship. 17 Cal. 3d at 435.
The following cases failed because the harm was not foreseeable: Brady v. Hopper, 570 F.
Supp. 1333 (D. Colo. 1983), aff'd, 751 F.2d 329 (10th Cir. 1984); Doyle v. United States, 530
F. Supp. 1278 (C.D. Cal. 1982); Leedy v. Hartnett, 510 F. Supp. 1125 (M.D. Pa. 1981) aff'd,
676 F.2d 686 (3rd Cir. 1982); Thompson v. County of Alameda, 27 Cal. 3d 741, 614 P.2d 728,
167 Cal. Rptr. 70 (1980).
85. Compare Leedy, 510 F. Supp. at 1125, 1130; Doyle v. United States, 530 F. Supp. at
1287-88 (C.D. Cal. 1982); Thompson v. County of Alameda, 27 Cal. 3d at 753-55, 614 P.2d at
734-36, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 76-78; Davis v. Lhim, 124 Mich. App. at 305-07, 335 N.W.2d 481,
489-90 (1983); with Jablonski v. United States, 644 F. Supp. at 1078-79, aff'd, 836 F.2d 209
(1986); Lipari v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 497 F. Supp. at 194-95.
86. Judge Richardson of the California Supreme Court framed the situation as follows:
[Warnings] do little to increase the precautions of any particular members of the
public who already may have become conditioned to locking their doors, avoiding
dark and deserted streets, instructing their children to beware of strangers and taking
other precautions.
[W]arnings to the police ... would be of little benefit in preventing assaults.., unless
we were to simultaneously and additionally impose a concurrent duty on the police
to act upon such warnings....
[T]o warn all neighborhood parents of small children that a potentially dangerous
[person] had been released in the area would require an expenditure of time and
limited resources. ...
Thompson v. County of Alameda, 27 Cal. 3d at 755-57, 614 P.2d at 736-37, 167 Cal. Rptr. at
78-79.
87. Currie v. United States, 644 F. Supp. 1074, 1077-78 (M.D.N.C. 1986) (quoting In re
Farrow, 41 N.C. App. 680, 255 S.E.2d 777 (1979) and Bradley Center, Inc. v. Wessner, 250
Ga. 199, 201 S.E.2d 693, 695-96 (1982) (advocating a rule which requires therapists to discuss
borderline cases tacitly approving the breach of confidentiality); Lipari v. Sears, Roebuck &
Co., 497 F. Supp. at 191 (quoting Simonsen v. Swenson, 104 Neb. 224, 177 N.W.2d 831
(1920)); McIntosh v. Milano, 168 N.J. Super. at 490-93, 403 A.2d at 512-13. See also Jablon-
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is logical in that psychotherapists do not practice strict confidentiality and
all parties would benefit from disclosure. 8 The patient would be rendered
harmless. The therapist would make society safer and encourage greater
societal trust in therapy as a social benefit. The third party would defend the
patient, continue to be a productive member of society, and appreciate ther-
apy as a beneficial and protective tool. Finally, society would benefit from
fewer Tarasoff type murders, fewer court cases, fewer prisoners, and an in-
creased trust in therapists.
Similarly, the courts have resoundingly denied the argument that ther-
apists are unable to predict a patient's potential dangerousness.8 9 The courts
only hold the therapist to a reasonableness standard which is measured by
the community's professionals. 90 The analogies are to medical doctors who
diagnose and prescribe treatment for contagious diseases. In McIntosh v.
Milano,91 Judge Petrella pointed to the inconsistency of the psychothera-
pists' position:
Defendant also claims that the imposition of a Tarasoff type duty
may deter therapists from treating potentially violent patients in
light of possible malpractice claims by third parties. . . . If the
psychiatrist claims inability to predict dangerousness or detect a
dangerous person, how will he make the determination to weed out
'potentially violent patients'?
If psychiatrists now say.., that therapists are no more accurate
than the average layman, serious questions would arise as to the
entire present basis for commitment procedures. 92
Therefore, psychotherapists must accept the duty or abdicate from their
claimed position of expertise.
ski v. United States, 712 F.2d 391 (9th Cir. 1983) (implicit because duty to use reasonable care
was found applicable).
88. Patient confidences are breached during consultations with other doctors, research,
and published case histories. Slovenko, supra note 9, at 380-84. Dangerous patient disclosures
were treated in the preceding section.
89. See, e.g., Jablonski, 712 F.2d at 398; Currie, 644 F. Supp. at 1082-83; Lipari, 497 F.
Supp. at 191-92; Davis, 124 Mich. App. at 299-304, 335 N.W.2d at 487-88; McIntosh, 168 N.J.
Super. at 478-90, 403 A.2d at 506-12; Peck v. Counseling Service of Addison County, 146 Vt.
61, 66-67, 499 A.2d 423, 425-26 (1985).
90. See, e.g., Jablonski, 712 F.2d at 398; Currie, 644 F. Supp. at 1082-83; Lipari, 497 F.
Supp. at 191-92; Davis, 124 Mich. App. at 299-304, 335 N.W.2d at 487-88; McIntosh, 168 N.J.
Super. at 478-90, 403 A.2d at 506-12; Peck v. Counseling Service of Addison County, 146 Vt.
61, 66-67, 499 A.2d 423, 425-26 (1985).
91. 168 N.J. Super. at 466, 403 A.2d at 500.
92. Id. at 493-95, 403 A.2d at 514.
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B. Legislative Proposals
The negative response that greeted the Tarasoff decision spurred several
legislative proposals. These proposals acknowledge the legitimacy of the
Tarasoff duty. Their import is to limit liability to the narrow strictures of
Thompson v. County of Alameda,9 3 by requiring specific threats to a readily
identifiable victim.
1. The California Amendment
In 1985, the California legislature amended its Civil Code § 43.92 to read:
(a) There shall be no monetary liability on the part of, and no
cause of action shall arise against, any person who is a psychother-
apist as defined in Section 1010 of the Evidence Code in failing to
warn of and protect from a patient's threatened violent behavior or
failing to predict and warn of and protect from a patient's violent
behavior except where the patient has communicated to the psy-
chotherapist a serious threat of physical violence against a reason-
ably identifiable victim or victims.
(b) If there is a duty to warn and protect under the limited
circumstances specified above, the duty shall be discharged by the
psychotherapist making reasonable efforts to communicate the
threat to the victim or victims and to a law enforcement agency.94
The legislative history of this provision explains that the amendment limits
the psychotherapists' liability to situations "where the patient has communi-
cated to the psychotherapist a serious threat of violence against a reasonably
identifiable victim." Implicitly this language limits Tarasoff.96 Unfortu-
93. 27 Cal. 3d 741, 614 P.2d 728, 167 Cal. Rptr. 70 (1980) (wrongful death action against
county for releasing juvenile offender who had threatened to kill a neighborhood child if re-
leased; the court found the threat unspecific and did not attach to a readily identifiable victim).
94. CAL. CIV. CODE § 43.92 (West 1987).
95. Id. The California Legislative Counsel's Digest reported the Bill as follows:
AB 1133, as amended, (McAlister). Damages against certain professionals.
Existing law provides that certain professionals are immune from monetary liabil-
ity or a cause of action for damages suffered by a person as a result of specified
actions performed in the course of the professional's duties. However, case law has
held that a psychiatrist may be liable for negligently failing to protect a person when
a patient presents a serious danger to that person.
This bill would provide for immunity from liability for a psychotherapist who fails
to warn of and protect from, or predict and warn of and protect from a patient's
threatened violent behavior, except where the patient has communicated to the psy-
chotherapist a serious threat of violence against a reasonably identifiable victim. This
bill would further provide that if a duty to warn and protect does exist, it would be
discharged by the psychotherapist making reasonable efforts to communicate the
threat to the victim and to a law enforcement agency.
Vote: majority. Appropriation: no. Fiscal Committee: no. State-mandated pro-
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nately the effect of this language has yet to be construed by California
courts.
9 7
2. APA's Model Bill
Also in 1985, the American Psychological Association circulated a model
bill:
(1) No monetary liability and no cause of action may arise
against any [psychologist or psychiatrist/psychotherapist/service
provider licensed under Chapter -] for failing to predict, warn
of or take precautions to provide protection from a patient's violent
behavior unless the patient has communicated to the [psychologist
or psychiatrist/psychotherapist/service provider licensed under
Chapter -] an actual threat of physical violence against a
clearly identified or reasonably identifiable victim.
(2) The duty to warn of or to take reasonable precautions to
provide protection from violent behavior arises only under the lim-
ited circumstances specified in subsection (1) of this section. The
duty shall be discharged by the [psychologist or psychiatrist/ psy-
chotherapist /service provider licensed under Chapter -] if rea-
sonable efforts are made [to communicate the threat to the victim
or victims] or [to seek civil commitment of the patient under Chap-
ter -] or [to notify the police department closest to the patient's
(or the victim's ) residence of the threat of violence].
(3) No monetary liability and no cause of action may arise
under Chapter - [patient privacy and confidentiality act]
against any [psychologist or psychiatrist /psychotherapist /service
provider licensed under Chapter -] for confidences disclosed to
third parties in an effort to discharge a duty arising under subsec-
tion (1) of this section according to the provisions of subsection (2)
of this section.9"
This proposal is very similar to the California legislation. Obviously, it at-
tempts to limit the psychotherapist's liability and delineates how he might
discharge his Tarasoff duty. This approach adopts the Thompson standard
which narrowly construes the specific threats against a readily identifiable
gram: no. Effective: Jan. 1, 1986. The supporters of the legislation were the Califor-
nia Psychiatric Association; California Medical Association; California State
Psychological Association; and the California Union of Safety Employees. The op-
position was the Citizen's Commission on Human Rights.
Review of Selected 1985 California Legislation, 17 PAC. L.J. 741-42 (1986).
96. Id.
97. This author's research does not indicate any cases construing this language.
98. LEGAL IssuES, NAT'L ASS'N OF STATE MENTAL HEALTH PROGRAM DIRECTORS
(Oct. 1985).
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victim.9 9 This legislative proposal, much like the California legislation, is
desirable in that psychologists should have general guidelines to follow. The
California legislation has not yet been construed by the courts and the de-
sired narrowing is speculative at best.
3. Dr. Salter's Proposal
Dianne S. Salter, Ph.D., has proposed a model statute. 1° ° This statute,
99. 27 Cal. 3d 741, 753-55, 614 P.2d 728, 733-36, 167 Cal. Rptr. 70, 76-78 (1980). The
psychotherapist's concern would be with the cases which expansively construe specific threats
and identifiable victims. E.g., Jablonski v. United States, 712 F.2d 391; Currie v. United States,
644 F. Supp. 1074; Lipari v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 497 F. Supp. 185; Davis v. Lhim, 124
Mich. App. 291, 335 N.W.2d 481.
100. Note, The Duty to Warn Third Parties: A Retrospective on Tarasoff, 18 RUTGERS L.J.
145, 162-63 (1986) [hereinafter Salter]:
Section 1. DEFINITIONS
As used in this article, the following words and phrases shall have the meanings
given them in this section.
(1) Mental health professional. Persons with professional training, experience
and demonstrated competence in the treatment of mental illness, or a trainee work-
ing under the direct supervision of a person with such training and performing the
duties usually performed by such a person. Such persons shall include, but not be
limited to, physicians, psychologists, social workers, nurses, or other qualified per-
sons designated by statute to practice psychotherapy or counseling.
(2) Patient. A person who has entered into a contractual or quasi-contractual
agreement with a mental health professional to receive psychotherapy or counseling
for the amelioration of emotional or mental health concerns. The following persons
SHALL NOT be considered a patient under this article: (a) a person who merely
initiates a telephone contact with a mental health professional; (b) a person who is
merely seen for an initial consultation; (c) a person who is being seen only for evalua-
tive purposes.
(3) Outpatient setting. An office, facility or clinic, or part thereof, which offers
mental health services in a nonrestrictive environment. Such a setting does not offer
restrictive confinement or involuntary treatment.
(4) Readily identifiable individual. A person whose identity can be ascertained
from the information given by the patient, either by use of a name, an accurate de-
scription of the person, or a location at which the person can be found.
Section 2. MANDATED DUTY
A mental health professional, performing services in an outpatient setting, has an
affirmative duty to take reasonable steps to report the threats of a patient that the
mental health professional has determined presents a foreseeable danger to a readily
identifiable individual or group of individuals.
Section 3. IMPLEMENTATION
(1) The mental health professional shall discharge his duty by taking the follow-
ing steps: (a) FIRST, if reasonable, secure the patient's permission to immediately
contact the person whose life is in danger and hold a joint consultation to attempt to
resolve the conflict that is precipitating the patient's action.
If that course of action is not reasonable or successful, then (b) SECOND, attempt
to persuade the patient to voluntarily commit himself or herself for evaluation and
inpatient treatment.
If that course of action is not reasonable or successful, then (c) THIRD, institute
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much like the California and APA offerings, attempts to narrow and clarify
the psychotherapist's duty. For example, in defining "patient", the proposal
specifically excludes initial consultations and evaluative contacts.° 1 Implic-
itly, these exclusions are based on the lack of an established relationship.
The argument would be made that the therapist did not have sufficient time
to evaluate the dangerousness of the patient. This limitation is initially ap-
pealing. However, a hypothetical can be derived which demonstrates such
blanket exclusions to be unwise.'0 2 Imagine Charles Manson dropping in at
the local therapist's for a free initial consultation. Certainly Mr. Manson's
tattoo, a Nazi swastika, positioned proudly between his eyes, his claim to
being Jesus Christ, and his assertions that the deaths of particular people
would benefit the community, should impose a duty on that therapist. Un-
fortunately, the definition would immunize the therapist.
Similarly, Dr. Salter's definition of "readily identifiable individual" is too
narrow.1"3 The language limits the information to that generated by the
patient. This provision could be construed that the therapist need not at-
tempt to collect information about the patient from other sources, such as
proceedings to have the patient involuntarily committed for evaluation and inpatient
treatment.
If that course of action is not reasonable or successful, then (d) FOURTH, notify
the local police, making them aware of the patient's name, his or her description, his
or her last known whereabouts, the name and any available information about the
individual who is in danger of harm because of the patient's threats.
(2) The mental health professional will fully cooperate with the police authorities
when that course of action is necessary.
Section 4. CONFIDENTIALITY
Any information disclosed as a result of the mental health professional's discharg-
ing of the duty mandated by this article, shall not be considered a breach of their
ethical and/or statutory duty to keep confidential all information communicated by
the patient.
The duty is based on the public policy consideration that when the state grants to
certain professionals a license, certificate or right to practice psychotherapy, that
grant includes an obligation to the public. Included in that obligation is a duty to
initiate protective measures for identifiable persons who are in foreseeable danger
from a patient of that mental health professional. Since our society has designated
agents whose specific duty is the protection of its citizens, the mental health profes-
sional should contact these agents, fully appraising them of the nature of the situa-
tion (persons involved, the kind of harm likely to be involved, etc.). If the patient can
be deterred by changing the therapeutic parameters or validly detained through in-
voluntary commitment, those measures may be taken in lieu of notifying the police.
101. Id. (Section 1. DEFINITIONS (2) Patient).
102. Consider the case of a person telling the therapist that he had just placed a time bomb
in a children's day care clinic across the street. In such a situation would the therapist have a
duty under the proposal?
103. Salter, supra note 100, at 162. (Section 1. DEFINITIONS (4) Readily identifiable
individual).
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hospitals, clinics, and the government. However, many courts have recog-
nized the therapist's duty to acquire information from outside sources when
necessary. °4 Therefore, such a limitation goes against the therapists' duty
of reasonable care.
Significantly, the proposal has a four-step implementation section.10 5 The
therapist is given a flexible approach to the duty depending upon the situa-
tion. This flexible approach is in accord with Tarasoff.06 Step one, "if rea-
104. Three examples follow: Jablonski v. United States, 712 F.2d 391, 398 (9th Cir. 1983):
unlike the killer in Tarasoff, Jablonski made no specific threats concerning any spe-
cific individuals. Nevertheless, Jablonski's previous history indicated that he would
likely direct his violence against Kimbal. He had raped and committed other acts of
violence against his wife. His psychological profile indicated that his violence was
likely to be directed against women very close to him. This, in turn, was borne out
by his attack on Pahls. Thus, Kimbal was specifically identified or "targeted" to a
much greater extent than were the neighborhood children in Thompson.
The finding that Kimbal was a foreseeable victim was dependent on the district
judge's finding that the doctors had been negligent in failing to obtain Jablonski's
prior medical history.
Secondly, Peck v. Counseling Service of Addison County, 146 Vt. 61, 66, 499 A.2d 422, 425-26
(1985):
The trial court nonetheless found that the therapist was negligent, and did not act as
a reasonably prudent counselor, because her good faith belief was based on inade-
quate information and consultation .... The evidence also revealed that at the time
of John's treatment the therapist was not in possession of John's most recent medical
history. The Counseling Service did not have a cross-reference system between its
therapists and outside physicians its therapists and outside physicians who were
treating the medical problems of its patients. Nor did the Counseling Service have
any written policy concerning formal intra-staff consultation procedures when a pa-
tient presented a serious risk of harm to another. The defendant's own expert testi-
fied that a therapist cannot make a reasonable determination of a patient's propensity
for carrying out a threatened act of violence, without knowledge of the patient's com-
plete medical history.
Finally, Davis v. Lhim, 124 Mich. App. 291, 306, 335 N.W.2d 481, 490 (1983):
As to the threat posed to Mollie Barnes in particular, the evidence consisted primar-
ily of one entry in a hospital record. [An aunt had reported that the patient kept
threatening the deceased]. We note first that these threats were directed to a specific
person, not to the general public. Thus, Mollie Barnes was a readily identifiable
potential victim. Second, the defendant was apparently aware of these threats, but
found them too remote to have any significance. Nevertheless, a jury could have
found that defendant should have realized these threats would recur after Patterson's
discharge.
105. Salter, supra note 100, at 162. Section 3. IMPLEMENTATION (1).
106. Tarasoff, 17 Cal. 3d at 439, 551 P.2d at 345, 131 Ca. Rptr. at 25 (footnote omitted).
In our view, however, once a therapist does in fact determine, or under applicable
professional standards reasonably should have determined, that a patient poses a seri-
ous danger of violence to others, he bears a duty to exercise reasonable care to pro-
tect the foreseeable victim of that danger. While the discharge of this duty of due care
will necessarily vary with the facts of each case .... (emphasis added).
Patient Threats Against Third Parties
sonable, secure the patient's permission to immediately contact the person
whose life is in danger and hold a joint consultation to attempt to resolve the
conflict that is precipitating the patient's action" is a good approach to the
problem but it dodges the informed consent issue.10 7 Should the therapist
tell the patient that unless he cooperates, his confidences will be breached?
The issue of informed consent and waiver by the patient is clouded.108
The remaining three steps provide for the therapist to first attempt to per-
suade the patient to seek voluntary commitment, then involuntary commit-
ment, and finally notifying the police.'0 9 This progression is logical in that
the least restrictive means and patient dignity are accorded priority. How-
ever, that priority is not sacred and the final two steps focus more upon the
interests of society and the third party than the interests of the patient.
Interestingly, warnings to the threatened third party are not mentioned in
the final three steps. Implicitly, the therapist cannot warn the third party
without the patient's consent. This goes against Tarasoff but is laudatory in
that warning a third party would be of little use." 0 Under the proposal, the
police would be contacted, but there is no requirement that they contact the
third party. The question is: What would you do if a therapist or the police
called and said a dangerous patient might be on the way to kill you? Proba-
bly, you would move to have the person detained/committed, and leave the
area for a time. Certainly paranoia would be an acceptable reaction.
Effectively, once a patient is determined to be dangerous, he should be
committed. Otherwise, a warning to the third party would cause a paranoia
which is patently unfair. Third party's paranoia could produce a preemptive
strike against the patient. Therefore, the psychotherapist should safeguard
the patient and the third party by committing the patient.
III. CONCLUSION
In sum, the psychotherapist owes a duty of reasonable care when evaluat-
ing patient threats against third parties. The exercise of this duty does con-
flict with the confidentiality of patient communications. However, a
balancing of interests weighs in favor of disclosure. This affirmative duty of
107. Note, Survey, supra note 5, at 176-77 and accompanying notes. The survey indicates
that the majority of psychotherapists do not inform their patients that their confidences will be
breached under the appropriate circumstances. Twenty-five percent of the respondents indi-
cated that the breach of confidentiality potentially cost them a patient. See also Shuman &
Weiner, supra note 12 and Beck, supra note 12. One Commentator has suggested that a Mi-
randa-type warning would ruin the therapeutic situation. Stone, supra note 8, at 369-70.
108. Stone, supra note 8, at 369-70. But see Fleming & Maximov, supra note 21, at 1059-
60.
109. Salter, supra note 100, at 162-63. (Section 3. IMPLEMENTATION (1) (b-d)).
110. Stone, supra note 8, at 374. But see Beck, supra note 12.
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disclosure is warranted because of the provocative nature of therapy which
encourages the discussion of aggression and resulting emotional instability.
Historically, psychotherapists have accepted this duty to disclose.
Regardless of the fact that they are inaccurate when predicting dangerous-
ness, psychotherapists have assumed the experts position in our legal system
and society. The experts mantle carries with it the burden of liability. This
result will benefit the patient, psychotherapist, third party, and society. The
patient will be protected from himself and reoriented as a productive mem-
ber of society. The psychotherapist will fulfill his professional responsibility
of keeping his patient, third party, and society safe. The third party will
remain a productive member of society. Society will benefit from the three
preceding beneficiaries and the savings of court costs, police power, and
growing trust among the community.
